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#33789
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT- CHANCERY DIVISION
)

Cherry Beasley,
Petitioner/Complainant
v.

Chicago Commission on Human
Relations
&

Betts Realty Group, P .C., Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMMON LAW PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
....

,

'::.:)

Petitioner, Cherry Beasley, by and through her attorneys, J. Damian Ortiz and the~:;
<rStudents of the John Marshall Fair Housing Legal Clinic, hereby complain ofDefendantC
en

Chicago Commission on Human Relations ("CCHR" "The Commission") and Betts Re~y
·...0:.

Group, P.C. ("Respondent") as follows:
VENUE
Ms. Beasley holds a Housing Choice voucher and filed a complaint with Defendant
Commission on or about January 29,2013. The case was docketed as number 12-H-77. In order
to have the Defendant Commission's Order and findings reviewed, CCHR regulations and the
Administrative Review Act ("ARA") require that a writ of certiorari be filed with the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Chancery Division pursuant to Commission regulation 250.150. See
Reg. 250.150 attached as Exhibit "A". The petition must be filed within 35 days from the time
that the Final Order was served. Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/3-103. See 735
ILCS 5/3-103 attached as Exhibit "B".

PARTIES
Defendant, CCHR was, at all times relevant to the matters set forth herein, the deciding
agency.
Defendant, CCHRis, at all times relevant to the matters set forth herein, an agency of the
City of Chicago with offices in County of Cook, State of Illinois.
Defendant, Betts Realty Group, P.C., was a proper Respondent and the only entity in
Case No. 12-H-77 alleged to have discriminated against the Petitioner, Ms. Beasley. The type of
discrimination alleged as well as the form of the discrimination that took place, has been held by
the Defendant, CCHR to be in violation of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance ("the
Ordinance") in several rulings. See Cooper v. Park Management and Investment, LLC, CCHR
Case No. 03-H-48 (November 17, 2003); Rankin v. 6945 N Sheridan Inc., et al, CCHR Case No.
08-H-49 at 6 (August 18, 2010); Shipp v. Wagner CCHR Case No. 12-H-19 (July 16, 2014).

PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On May 29,2015, Defendant CCHR issued a final order, titled "Order Denying Request
for Review." ("CCHR Order") See as Exhibit "B". The Request for Review was filed in
response to an order titled, "Order Finding No Substantial Evidence." ("CCHR Final Order")
See as Exhibit "C". A true and correct copy of each Order is attached hereto respectfully as
Exhibits "B" and "C".
The Defendant, CCHR is the only tribunal where a source of income case may be filed
within the City of Chicago. As such, the Defendant, CCHR's Order requires this common law
petition for writ of certiorari to be filed and the ARA mandates its filing with this Court.
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FACTS
Cherry Beasley receives a 2-bedroom Housing Choice Voucher, which is administered by
the Chicago Housing Authority's ("CHA") mobility program. She has held this voucher for 24
years. She found out about a 2-bedroom house at 10506 S. Woods, Chicago, IL, through the
Section 8 mobility program. She called the Betts Realty Group Office ("Betts") on or about
October 9, 2012 and was told to come and view the property on that same day at 4:00PM with
realtor Peter Chrysanthou ("Chrysanthou"). Ms. Beasley showed up at the property for the
scheduled meeting and after waiting for 2 hours, Chrysanthou rescheduled with her for the same
time on the next day.
On or about October 10, 2012, Ms. Beasley showed up again for her appointment to view
the property. Chrysanthou again did not show up as scheduled and instead sent Ms. Beasley a text
message stating, that he had been told that he unit was not Section 8 approved. CCHR Order
Finding No Substantial Evidence at 5, (October 9, 2013). See Ex. C. Chrysanthou had spoken to
Ms. Hinton, agent for Betts. In that conversation he asked Hinton if the unit was Section 8
approved. Hinton replied, "no." Id. See Ex. C. Betts has admitted to the discrimination by stating
that Section 8 was not approved at that location under paragraph two of their response to Ms.
Beasley's original complaint (with previous counsel). Respondent's Response to Complaint, at 3
(January 17, 2013.).

Betts stated this was their reason; advising Chrysanthou to cancel his

appointment with Ms. Beasley. The viewing of the housing was no longer necessary once Betts
advised Chrysanthou that Ms. Beasley's source of income to pay the rent was not accepted.
In October of 2013 the Chicago Commission on Human Relations ("CCHR") issued its
determination ofNo Substantial Evidence. Specifically, the Commission found that "There is no
showing that Hinton's answer to Chrysanthou's question expressed any refusal to participate in
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the Housing Choice Voucher program, or a belief that the unit would not qualify for the program.
Hinton merely responded to a question. There was no evidence that Respondent would not have
accepted or processed an application from the Complainant." CCHR Order Finding No Substantial
Evidence at 7, (October 9, 2013). Emphasis added. See Ex. C.

On May 29, 2015 the CCHR denied the Beasley's Request for Review. The Order was
mailed on June 11, 2015. See Ex. D. Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Act, 735 ILCS
5/3-101, Beasley may seek further review by filing a common law writ of certiorari with the
Chancery Division ofthe Circuit Court of Cook County within 35 days from when the Order was
served.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the court reviews the findings and conclusions of an administrative agency,
questions of fact are "held to be prima facie true and correct." Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 352 Ill.
App. 3d 87, 90 (1st Dist. 2004). The court is not permitted to overturn a decision by an

administrative body "unless the authority of the administrative body was exercised in an arbitrary
or capricious manner." !d. "Arbitrary and Capricious" is legally synonymous with "abuse of
discretion" which is defined as "determinations that are wholly inconsistent with the facts and
circumstances ... and the deductions that can reasonably be made from the facts and circumstances;
any unreasonable, unconscionable [or] arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the
facts and law pertaining to the matter submitted." Steven H Gifts, Barron's Law Dictionary (6th
Ed 2010).

The court may also overturn an administrative decision if that decision is against the
manifest weight of evidence. Godinez at 90. Quoting 0 'Neil v. Ryan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 392, 400
(1st Dist. 1998). Moreover, the court may overturn a decision if it finds that the agency's decision
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was "palpably erroneous." Atkins v. City of Chicago Comm 'n Human Refs. ex rei. Lawrence, 281
Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1074 (1st Dist.l996) quoting Hsu v. Human Rights Comm 'n 180 Ill. App. 3d
949, 953 (1st Dist. 1989). On the other hand, the court need not give deference to the
Administrative agency in regards to questions oflaw, which are reviewed de novo. Godinez at 90.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION ERRED BY APPLYING THE WRONG EVIDENTIARY
STANDARD

The Order Finding No Substantial Evidence, issued by the Commission in October of2013
states that the basis for the finding was that the Respondent's agent, Hinton, did not express refusal
to participate in the Housing Choice Voucher program. Order Finding No Substantial Evidence,
CCHR Case No. 12-H-77 at 7 (October 9, 2013). See Ex. C. The Commission offers no other
rationale, however the subsequent Order Denying Request for Review elaborates further. Order
Denying Request for Review, CCHR Case No. 12-H-77 at 1, 2 (October 9, 2013). See Ex. D.

Despite the fact that Beasley's claim that she was told that the unit was not "Section 8 approved"
was corroborated by Chrysanthou and the Respondent admitted to making that statement, the
Commission states that it "believed" Hinton when she asserted that she was simply answering
Chrysanthou's question. Jd. It begs the question: How is this not a party admission and direct
evidence that the Ordinance was violated?
The Commission has held that a violation of the CFHO occurs when there is a refusal to
consider an applicant to rent an apartment due to her protected status. Gardner v. Ojo, CCHR Case
No. 10-H-50 at 9 December 19, 2012). The Rules and Regulations Governing the Fair Housing
Ordinance specifically state that, "[i]t is a violation of the [Fair Housing Ordinance] for a person

to refuse to sell, rent, or lease a dwelling to a person or to refuse to negotiate with a person for
sale, rental or leasing of a dwelling because of that person's membership in a protected class. Such
5

prohibited actions include but are not limited to: (a) Failing to accept or consider a person's offer
because of that person's membership in a protected class." Rankin v. 6954 N Sheridan, Inc.,
CCHR Case No. 08-H-49 at 6 (August 18, 201 0) quoting CCHR Reg. 420.130 (a).
The Rules and Regulations Governing the Fair Housing Ordinance further make it a violation
to:
"cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling which indicates
any actual or intended preference, limitation, or discrimination because of
a person's membership in one of the protected classes. (a) the prohibition
will apply to all written, or oral notices, statements, or advertisements by
any ... person ... having the right to sell, rent, lease, or sublease any housing
accommodation or any agent of these. (b) Discriminatory notices,
statements and advertisements include but are not limited to, the following:
I) using words, phrases ... which would convey or suggest to a reasonable
person any preference, limitation, or discrimination regarding the
availability ofa dwelling based on membership in a protected class. " Shipp
v. Wagner and Wagner, CCHR Case No. 12-H-19 at 4-5 (July 16, 2014)
quoting CCHR Reg. 420. I 20. Emphasis added.
It is undisputed that when Beasley informed Chrysanthou that she intended to use a

Housing Choice voucher, he spoke to Respondent's agent, Hinton, and asked if the unit was
"Section 8 approved." It is also undisputed that Hinton replied, "no." Respondent's Response to

Complaint, at 3 (January 17, 2013.). Despite the fact that Hinton, an agent of a person having the
right to rent a dwelling, caused an oral statement suggesting a limitation on Beasley's ability to
rent the apartment, the Commission found No Substantial Evidence. The Commission stated that
it "believed" that Hinton was only answering a question rather than expressing discriminatory
intent and there was no evidence that the statement indicated a refusal to participate in the voucher
program. Order Finding No Substantial Evidence, CCHR Case No. 12-H-77 at 7 (October 9,
2013). See Ex. C.

However, in a subsequent matter, the Commission held in favor of the

complainant where the respondent placed an ad on Craigslist stating, "Not Section 8 approved.
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Shipp at 3. During the hearing the respondent testified that he spoke to the complainant by phone
and when she asked him if he "would accept Section 8" he told her "he was not Section 8
approved." Jd at 4.
While most intentional discrimination claims rely on indirect evidence, when a
complainant has direct evidence, she can "prove intent" with credible evidence showing
"discriminatory intent." Rankin at .6. Direct evidence is that which, "if believed, will allow a
finding of discrimination with no need for inferences. ld.
Furthermore, "[u]nder the direct evidence method in a fair housing case, a complainant
may meet her burden of proof through credible evidence that the respondent directly stated or
otherwise indicated that s/he would not offer housing to a person based on a protected class, such
as having and intending to use a Section 8 voucher." Shipp at 5. The Commission does not require
corroboration by other evidence in order to prove a complainant's claim. Rankin at 10.
In the case at bar, and as stated above, Hinton does not dispute that she answered "no" to
the question regarding Section 8. Although not required, Chrysanthou corroborates this fact. The
Commission applied the indirect evidence standard to this statement. Yet, in the earlier Rankin
matter, the Commission treated an analogous statement as direct evidence. Rankin at 4, 7. The
Commission held the same in a subsequent case where the respondent told the complainant by
phone that he was "not Section 8 approved." Shipp at 4. In this case, the Commission has derailed
itself from its own precedent.
The Commission states time and again that it based its decision in the present case on the
fact that Beasley failed to present credible evidence demonstrating discriminatory intent on the
part of Hinton or the Respondents.

However, had the Commission applied the direct evidence

standard, as it should have, it would not have been necessary to make inferences into Hinton's
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intent. Rankin at 6. Beasley should not have had to present any evidence beyond the statement
itself for the Commission to at minimum find the scintilla of evidence necessary to proceed. Shipp
at 6.
Because the Commission has found No Substantial Evidence based on an erroneous
evidentiary standard, inconsistent with the standard applied to its own precedent with similarly
situated complainants and because the decision was contrary to both CCHR precedent and
regulations, Beasley could not reliably predict an equitable application of the law. For that
reason, the Commission's decision was both arbitrary and capricious and merits review and
reversal by this Court.

II.

THE COMMISSION ERRED BY ARBITRARILY APPLYING THE FUTILE
GESTURE DOCTRINE
In general the Commission holds that submitting an application is an element of

establishing a prima facie case where submission of an application is a "necessary precondition to
rent[.]" Gardner at 10. However an exception is made if the complainant can demonstrate that
completing and submitting an application would have been a "futile gesture." Jd. The futile gesture
doctrine is used when the complainant does not complete an application after it has been made
clear "the respondent will not rent to the complainant because of a protected status. Rankin at 7.
The doctrine is used when, under the indirect evidence method, the complainant must show that
an application was submitted." Gardner at 10.
The Commission places a great deal of weight on the fact that Beasley did not submit an
application to rent the apartment after Chrysanthou canceled the showing upon receiving his
answer from Hinton. Order Denying Request for Review, CCHR Case No. 12-H-77 at 2 (October
9, 2013). "There is no evidence that Respondent would not have accepted or processed and
application from [Ms.Beasley]." Order Finding No Substantial Evidence, CCHR Case No. 12-H8

77 at 7 (October 9, 2013). See Ex. C. The Commission has been inconsistent in regards to the
importance it places on whether or not the complainant submits an application. See Rankin v. 6945
N. Sheridan Inc., et al, CCHR Case No. 08-H-49 at 6 (August 18, 2010); Shipp v. Wagner CCHR

Case No. 12-H-19 (July 16, 2014).
In Jones v. Shaheed, CCHR Case No. 00-H-82 at 14-16 (October 24, 2003) the
Commission established a four-prong test for when the doctrine will be applied to a complainant.
First, the complainant must show that "she is a member of a protected class who was a bona fide
renter of the property and financially able to rent the apartment at the time it was available." ld.
Second, she must that the owner or owner's agent discriminated against members of the same
class.

ld. Third, the complainant must show she was reliably informed of the policy of

discrimination.ld. The fourth prong is that the respondent "would have" discriminated against the
complainant if she did indeed apply. ld. Emphasis added.
The reality is that the test is little more than a tautology; in that it can only be applied where
the respondent has so obviously engaged in a discriminatory practice (by explicitly communicating
a discriminatory policy) that the complainant would have direct evidence sufficient to avoid the
need of the doctrine altogether. Id.

The fourth prong is particularly problematic, requiring the

complainant to show that they didn't apply because they would have been denied if they did. ld.
Through the Jones test, the Commission has set up a complicated scheme that expects the
complainant to attempt to predict the future at best and prove a negative at worst.

It is not always entirely clear to the Commission when it should apply the doctrine. It
writes, " ... the Commission has applied the futile gesture doctrine only where respondents have
unambiguously communicated their discriminatory policies to complainants." Gardner at 12.
Emphasis added. This is untrue. In Rankin there is no mention of the test. The CCHR held that
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failure to complete an application was "of no consequence" because [Rankin] was rejected before
he applied. Rankin at 7. In Rankin, the Complainant intended to have his daughter complete an
application until respondent called him and said they were not renting to Section 8 recipients. !d.
at 7. The Commission also held that it was not fatal to the case that neither the hearing officer nor
the Commission found that the respondents maintained a "blanket policy" against renting to
Section 8 voucher holders, rather the dispositive fact was that the respondent's agent "told the
complainant that he would not be able to rent the unit he wanted ... " Id. at 10-11. Yet, in Gardner,
they applied the test to the detriment of the complainant. Gardner at 11.
Similar to Rankin, the Commission allowed a complainant to invoke the doctrine simply
by alleging that the respondent's agent stated that the respondents would not accept a Section 8
voucher. Cooper v. Park Management and Investment, Ltd., CCHR Case No. 03-H-48 (November
17, 2003).

Like Rankin and Shipp, the Respondent's agent told Beasley, albeit through

Chrysanthou that the available unit was not "Section 8 approved." Nevertheless, the Commission
weighed Beasley's implicit belief in the futility of submitting an application against her. Neither
the Order Finding No Substantial Evidence nor the Order Denying Request for Review mentions
the Commission's own test found in Jones. See Ex. C and Ex. D.
Post Jones it is impossible to know when the Commission will allow a complainant to
invoke the futile gesture doctrine or whether the four-prong Jones test will apply or not. This is
by definition arbitrary. It necessarily leads to inconsistent application of the law and creates
insecurity for complainants with legitimate and reasonable belief that their submission of an
application would have been futile. Because the Commission applies the futile gesture doctrine
arbitrarily, the Circuit Court should review its findings.
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III.

THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE CHICAGO FAIR HOUSING ORDINANCE
THEREBY DEFEATING THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT
The Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance was enacted to provide protection to those who

belong to protected classes from discrimination.

The CCHR has been given the task of

adjudicating violations and therefore it has been primarily responsible for construing and
interpreting the meaning of the Ordinance. Page v. City ofChicago, 229 Ill. App. 3d 450, 463 (I st
Dist. 1998). The Commission erroneously found No Substantial Evidence in the Beasley matter
because it too narrowly construed the term "prospective renter." The Commission additionally
misinterpreted the CFHO by limiting violations only to discrimination when the ordinance also
prohibits distinctions. Through these errors the Commission has violated its own rules regarding
statutory construction and defeated the express purpose of the CFHO to the detriment of Beasley.
For the reasons fully set forth above, the CCHR should have applied the direct evidence
standard to the evidence submitted by Ms. Beasley. However, when the Commission used the
indirect evidence method, they require that the complainant demonstrate a prima facie case for
housing discrimination. Gardner at 10. To do so, the complainant must satisfy four elements: 1)
establish that she is a member of a protected class; 2) show that the respondents knew she was a
member of the protected class; 3) show that she was "ready and able" to rent the unit; and 4)
establish that she was not allowed to rent the unit. Pierce v. New Jerusalem Christian Development
Corp., CCHR Case No. 07-H-12113 at 5 (February 16, 2011).

The Commission holds that to satisfy element three, the complainant must submit an
application when the application is a "necessary precondition" to rent. Gardner at 10. Ostensibly,
this is to ensure that the complainant was truly eligible to rent and that the denial was truly
discriminatory. !d. However, the CFHO states:
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"It shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful for any owner, lessee,
sublessee, assignee, managing agent, or other person, form or corporation
having the right to sell, rent, lease or sublease any housing accommodation,
within the City of Chicago, or any agent of theses, or any real estate broker
licensed as such:
A) To make any distinction, discrimination or restriction against any person
in the price, terms, conditions or privileges of any kind relating to the
sale, rental, lease or occupancy of any real estate used for residential
purposes in the City of Chicago or in the furnishing of any facilities or
services in connection therewith, predicated upon the ... source of
income or the prospective or actual buyer or tenant thereof. .. "

CFHO, § 5-08-030. Emphasis added.

When the Commission construes the CFHO it "must look first to its language, giving words
their popular, ordinary and plain meaning unless otherwise defined. Smith v. Wilmette Real Estate
& Management Co., CCHR Case No. 95-H-159 at 3 (April13, 1999). It further holds that because

the purpose of the ordinance is remedial it should be liberally construed. Id The Commission has
"a duty to avoid a construction of the [CFHO] that would defeat the [ordinance's] purposes or
yield an absurd or unjust result." Jd quoting In re: A.P., 179 Ill. 2d. 184 (Ill. 1997). Additionally,
it holds that the City Council "clearly expressed its policy that 'all residents' of the city" should
not be discriminated against as they seek housing. Id at 5. See also Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey,
352 Ill. App. 3d. 87 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004).
The Appellate Court of Illinois holds that in statutory construction, the intent of the
legislative body is the "controlling inquiry" and the "language is the best indicator of intent."
Atkins v. City ofChicago Comm 'n Human Rels. ex ref. Lawrence, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1077 (1st

Dist.l996).
The pertinent issue is whether a complainant must have actually applied (in absence of
invoking the previously discussed "futile gesture" doctrine) to be considered a "prospective
renter." The Commission claims that it will give the words of the ordinance their plain and popular
12

meaning. Smith at 3. The definition of "prospective" is "(of a person) expected or expecting to be
something particular in the future." Christine A. Lindberg, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d
Ed. 2010). For instance, The John Marshall Law School Website, as well as countless other
university websites, has a link for "Prospective Students." The John Marshall Law School, Home
Page, http://www.jmls.edu (last visited June 18, 20 15).
A potential student need not complete an application to access this tab. On the contrary,
the tab itself offers a link and instructions for application. !d. To require that a complainant submit
an application in order to become a "prospective renter" ignores the plain and popular meaning of
the term. The Commission's arbitrary distinction defeats the intent and purpose of the ordinance
and leads to "absurd and unjust" findings.
Indeed, no other term or phrase within the CFHO is construed in a way that narrows the
common meaning. Instead the words are given broad meaning, often beyond their plain meaning
in an attempt to grant added protection for the populations covered by the ordinance as intended
by the City Council. Smith at 5. It is well established that ambiguous terms like "source of income"
have been broadly construed by the Commission and the definition affirmed by the Appellate
Court of Illinois. Godinez at 91.

The Commission has even construed "race," perhaps the least

ambiguous of the protected classes, in the broadest way possible, allowing a white tenant to sue
for racial discrimination when he was denied the opportunity to have an African-American
roommate. Anderson v. Stavropoulos, CCHR Case No. 98-H-14 at 5 (February 16, 2000).
In the instant case, Ms. Beasley was a prospective renter the moment she inquired with
Chrysanthou about the advertised unit. The Commission saw otherwise. However, it is clear that
the Commission erred in its finding by not following its own rules of statutory construction and
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too narrowly construing the term "prospective renter" by limiting the term to those who have
completed the application process.
In addition to the aforementioned rules regarding statutory construction, the Appellate
Court of Illinois additionally held that when construing a statute it must be read as a whole and
"no word should be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless." Atkins at 1077.
Beasley mentioned to her realtor, Chrysanthou that she intended to use her "Section 8"
voucher to pay for the unit in question. Chrysanthou then asked Hinton if the apartment was
"Section 8 approved." It is self-evident that to ask and answer that question required that a
distinction be made between Ms. Beasley and someone who would not require the voucher to pay
the rent. A prospective renter without a "Section 8" voucher would render the question and answer
moot because the question would most likely not be asked (and therefore not answered) at all.
A distinction was in fact made and completed the violation of the ordinance. The
Commission's findings ignored that this, or that any, distinction was made. To be more precise,
the Commission interpreted the ordinance in such a way as to render the word, "distinction"
meaningless. As a result, Ms. Beasley's case was dismissed and the Commission subsequently
refused to review its finding in spite of the numerous errors raised by the Request for Review
and its own precedent. For this reason, this Court should review and reverse the findings of the
Commission in this case.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Ms. Beasley respectfully prays that this Court
issue a Writ of Certiorari in this cause requiring Defendants to file the record of all matters
relating to this decision with the Court; that the Court review the decision of the Defendants,
reverse the Order of the Commission, and for any other relief this Court deems as equitable.

Respectfully Submitted,

amien Ortiz, Esq.
omey for Complainant
J. Damian Ortiz, Esq.
Matthew C. Scoles, Senior Law Student
The John Marshall Law School
Fair Housing Legal Clinic
315 South Plymouth Court
Chicago, IL 60604
Phone:312-786-2267
Fax: 312-427-2236
Firm No. 33789
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SUBPART 250

REVIE\V AND

SECTION 250.100

REVIEW

Reg. 250.110

C01\IPLIAl~CE

Review of Dismissals

A complainant seeking review of the full or partial dismissal of a complaint by the Commission or a
hearing officer must file and serve a request for review within 28 days of the mailing of the dismissal order.
The request must be served on all other parties and the hearing officer (if any). Leave may be granted to
respond or reply.

Reg. 250.120

Other Review

In addition to revie'.v of dismissals under Reg. 250.110. the following oppornuut.Jes for review or
reconsideration are available under these regulations: (a) motion to vacate or modify procedural sanctions
tmder Reg. 235.150, (b) request for review of decisions not to disqualify a hearing officer under Reg.
240.220, and (c) objections to a hearing officer's recommended ruling including any request for review of
interlocutory decisions made during the hearing process under Regs. 240.610(b) and Reg. 240.630(b)(2).
No request for review is available for dismissals or other decisions by the Board of Commissioners; see
Reg. 250.150 as to appeal of final orders.

Reg. 250.130

(a)

Content and Grounds for Review
Content

A request for review must state with specificity the reasons, evidence, or legal authority requiring reversal
or modification of the decision in question. The request may not exceed 10 pages without leave from the
Commission and must clearly state that the party is seeking reconsideration or review. Any new testimonial
or documentary evidence must be provided with the request.
(b)

Grounds

Grounds for reversal or modification may include relevant evidence which is newly discovered and not
available at the time of the original decision; new and dispositive legal precedent not available at the time
of the original decision; a material misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission which was a basis for the
decision; or a material error by the Commission or hearing officer. If a complaint was dismissed for failure
to cooperate, the request for review must (I) establish good cause for the complainant's noncompliance, at
the time required, with the requirement which \vas the basis for dismissal; and (2) include any missing
material which was a basis for the dismissal or show good cause for not doing so.
Reg. 250.140

Grant or Denial of Request for Review

For dismissal orders entered by the Commission, the Commission shall rule on any request for review. For
dismissal orders entered by a hearing officer, the hearing officer shall rule on any request for review. The
Board of Commissioners shall rule on any request for review submitted with objections to a hearing
officer's recommended ruling. If granting a reversal or modification pursuant to a request for review, the
order shall describe any fi.uther proceedings in the case.
Reg. 250.150

Appeal of a Final Order

To appeal a final order of the Commission, a party must seek a writ of certiorari from the Chancery
Di\ision of the Circuit Court of Cook County according to applicable law. Neither the Commission nor the
Board of Commissioners shall accept or consider requests for review of a final order.
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5/3-103. Commencement of action, IL ST CH 735 § 5/3-103

W est3Sm jth-H urd IllinoisCom oiEd Stab..!tesAnnotated
Chap"!Er 735 .C:iv:ilProCEC!ur.e
ActS .Code ofC:il.ril.ProCEC!ur.e (Ref!; & Annas)
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5/3-103 .Com m encan entofactbn

E f1Bct:iye;Augustl4,200 8
Currentness

§ 3-103. Commencement of action. Every action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of
a complaint and the issuance of swnmons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was

served upon the party affected by the decision, except that in municipalities with a population of 500,000 or less a complaint
filed within the time limit established by this Section may be subsequently amended to add a police chief or a fire chief in cases
brought under the Illinois Municipal Code's provisions providing for the discipline of fire fighters and police officers.
The method of service of the decision shall be as prmrided in the Act governing the procedure before the administrative agency,
but if no method is provided, a decision shall be deemed to have been served either when a copy of the decision is personally
delivered or when a copy of the decision is deposited in the United States mail, in a sealed envelope or package, with postage
prepaid, addressed to the party affected by the decision at his or her last known residence or place of business.
The form of the summons and the issuance of alias summons shall be according to rules of the Supreme Court.
This amendatory Act of 1993 applies to all cases involving discipline of flre fighters and police officers pending on its effective

date and to all cases filed on or after its effective date.
The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly apply to all actions filed on or after
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly.

Credits
P.A. 82-280, § 3-103, eff. July 1,1982. Amended by.P..&Jl.~.:]._,_§ 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1994;P.A,.,_~_:UQ,_§_i,_~.ff_.[y.Jy2Q.,J.29...?.;EA
88-670, Art. 2. § 2-67, eff. Dec. 2. 1994: P.A_,__§_2_:_q.82,_ § 25. eff. Jtme l. 1997: P.A. 95-831, § 5, eff. Aug. 14. 2008.
Forml'rly Ill.Rev.Stat.199L ch. 110, ~ 3-103.

VALIDITY
<The Appellate Court of Illinois. First District, has held that a population classification conceming a plaintiffs right
to amend an administrative review complaint by adding a defendant constitutes special legislation in violation of
S_~Ji_()p_J~_9LMi.c:J~JJ[ pf t!J._e_Illill<.?i§_(;QD~ittni9.ll in the case of Li!c.DY..L:e_()Ji~~JlA <>( t.ll_e__<::ity Q.fSru£~g_o_, J:\pp.
illi~t.I997. 225 IU.Dec. 6Q~ 29UlL~PP~:3..9 397_. 683 N.E.2d 1265.>
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City of Chicago
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
740 N. Sedgwick, Suite 400 floor, ChicagQ, IL 60654
312n44-4111 (Vo-ice), 312n44-1081 (Fax), 312n44-1088 (TDD)

IN THE MATTER OF:
Cherry Beasley
Complainant,

v.
Betts Realty Group, P.C.
Respondent.

I
I
.I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

TO:
J.Dc.unian Ortiz

CaseNo.: 12-l!-77
Date Mailed: October 9, 2013

lzor~ Hintcm

John l'v:[arshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic
55 E; Jack:son, Suite 1020
Chicago, IL 60604

Betts:ReaJty G,rol,lp; P.C.

9730 S. WestemAve.

Evergreen Park, n.. 60805

The Chicago Coiiltfiission on Human Relations ba:s;determined thatthete is no subst®tial evidence of the
·
ordinance violations al:lt~ged in this matter. Accordingly; tiie case is DISMISSED.
The enclosed Investigation Summary andDetenninationbigb.lignts evjdence the Commission found relevant
to its decision but does not necessarily describe all evidence received @,dreviewed. It states the reasoning of
the Commission's authorized senior staff but may or may not reflect any investigator's view.s.
Parties or their attorneys may now inspect the invesclg~tion file pursuant to Reg. 220.410. Requests must be
made at least two business days befor~ the requesting person wishes the serviCe.

CQmplainant may seek review of this order by filing and sen?ng a "requestfor review" within 28. days
of tbe date of mailing shown above, pursuant.to Reg. 25().110•.. An optional form is. available from the
'

Commission. A request for review may not exceeq ten pages withoutleave of the Cotnll)jssion and must
clearly state that the party is seeking reccmsideratiori or r~view. The requestfor review mUSt be served on all
otlJ.er parties. It must state with specifiCity the tea,sons, evidence, or legal authority requiring reversal pr
modification of this dismissal order. Any newly-discovered evidence must be provided with the request.
See the next page for the text of regulations about file access and requests for review; Any requests for file
access or communications about a request for review should be directed to JoAnn Newsome, Director of
Human Rights Compliance, telephone, 312/744-1548. Do not direct further communications about this case
to any investigator.
CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
Entered: O<;tober 4, 2013

SELECTED REGULATIONS
Applicable After Findings of No Substantial Evidence

A full set of regulations is available from the Commission or at www.cityofchicago.org/hwnanrelations.
REQUEST FOR REVIEW
Reg. 250.110. Review of Dismissals. A complainant seeking review of the full or partial dismissal of a
complaint by the Commission or a hearing officer must file and serve a request for review within 28 days of
the mailing of the dismissal order. The request must be served on all otherparties and the hearing officer (if
any). Leave may be granted to respond or reply.
Reg. 250.130(a). Content of a Request for Review. A request forrevi~w must state with specificity the
reasons, evidence, or legal authority requiring· reversal or mo9ification of the qecision in question. The
request may not exceed 10 pages without leave from the Co11Uni$sicm and must clearly state that the party is
seeking reconsideration or review. Any new testimonial ordocumentaryevidencen:n.Jst be provided with the
request.
·Reg. 250.130(b). Grounds for a Request for ReView. Groun<isforreversal or modification may include
relevant evidence which is newly discovered and not available at the time of the ori!Mal cJecision; new and
dispositive legal precedent not available at the· time of the original decision; a materjal misrepresentation,
misstatement, or omission which was a basi~ for the deCision; or a material error by the Commission or
hearing officer. If a complaint was dismissed for failure to coopera~. the reqi,J:esJ for review PJ.ust (1)
establish good cause for the complainant' snoncompliance~attbe tUne requited, with the requjrement which
was the basis for dismissal; and (2) include any missing material which was a basis for the dismissal or show
good cause for not doing so.
· ..
·
Reg. 250.140. Grant or Denial of Requestfor Review. For dismissal orders entered by the Commission,
the Commission shall rule on any request for review. For dismissal orders entered by a hearing officer, the·
hearing officer shall rule on any request for review. The Board of Comiliissioners shall rule on any request
·for review submitted with objections to a hearing officer's recornme:nded ruling. If granting a reversal or
modification pursuant to a request for review, the order shall describe any further proceedings in the case.
ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIVE FILES
Reg. 220.410(a). Access to Files: General Nondisclo~tu•e and Access by Parties. Neither the Commission
nor itS staff shall disclose any information obtained in lh~ course of investigation or mediation of a case
except where otherwise required by law or intergoverriirlental agreement, or as ordered by a hearing officer
pursuant to Reg. 240.370. ·However, after providing the Con:unissionwitb no~ice. ofat least two business
days, parties or· their attorneys of recordmayiqspecffiles pertaining to their own cas~ at any time after
issuance of an order concluding the invesfigation.process or dismissin·g the case in its entirety.
(1)
Notwithstanding the above,. the Co.mmission sb.a.Upot allow parties to inspect .internal memoranda,
work papers, or notes generated by Comii1ission st~ffot agents in the course ofaninvestigation, or
other materials reflecting the deliberative process, mental impressions, or legal theories and
recommendations of the staff or agents of the Cotnmission.
··
If a party files a written motion establ~shing good cause or if the Commission sua sponte determines
(2)
that good cause exists, the Cotnmission may req\lire parties seeking access to an investigative file to
comply with a protective order limiting use.bfthe information to Commission or related state court
proceedings and prohibiting other diselosute ofinformation from the me.
Reg. 220.410(c). Access to Files: Copying Costs~ The Commission shall furnish copies of documents
available for inspection at a charge not to exceed 20 cents per page plus any delivery costs. Copies shall not
be released to the requester until the Commission has received payment in full. A party may seek waiver of

these charges pursuant to Section 270.600.
Section 270.600. Waiver of Commission Fees. A party may by written motion request that the
Commission waive its fees for copies of Commission documents. The motion shaJl be granted only on
submission of an affidavit or other statement under oath plus any addition;tl documentation establishing by
objective evidence that the requesting party is unable to pay the charges and that the copies sought are
necessary for pursuit of the party's claims or defenses in a Commission case.· If the party's attorney of record
was obtained through a not~for~profitlegal assistance provider; tlleattoflley' s certjficatiouthat the provider
has determined the party to be indigent is sufficient objectiveevidertce of inability to pay.

C~;tse

No. 12-H-77

City of Chicago
COMMISSION ON :mJMA.N RELATIONS
INVESTIGATION S~Y
< :: .. · ... ·

C~eNumber

12-H:-77 .

.·. Complainailt Chen:y J:J.easley
. _.• ~~spo~dent Betts Realty Group P.C.
Type ot Case _.Employment .. X Housing
-. CtAIM
BASIS
Refusal to rent

.

.

Source of Income

· pate Coniplaiilt:Filed November21;2012
1.

...;....Pu~Iic Accomnjodatio1.l

_._C.tedit_Bon<liilg

. DETJiiroVUNATION

..

No Bubstantial Evidence

Dateo(:Viola.tioil·Octoberl0,--2012-..

COMPLAINANT POSITION

Complainant is the recipient of a two-bedroom Ho-qsing Choice Voucher, Complainant
alleges that on or around October 10, 2012, she had an appointment to view a two-beqroom unit
at 10506 S. Wood Street in Chicago with her realtor, Peter Chrys;:mthou. Complainant alleges
that on October 10, she received a text message from Chrysanthc,u i:h which he stated,-"! was just
advised that Wood is not Section 8 approved so our showing is cancelled." Complainant alleges
that the listing agent from Betts.Realty Group told Chrysanthou that the unit was "not Section 8
approved."

2.

RESPONDENT DESCRIPTION & BACKGROUND
Respondent is a realty agency located in Evergr;e.en Park, lllinois.

· 3.

RESPONDENT POSITION

Respondent states that the property was not available for renton October 10,2012, but
became available on October 20, 2012. Respondent asserts that on October 22, 2012, it received
·a call and an e-mail from Real Estate Agent Peter Chrysanthou requesting a showing of the
property at 10506 S. Wood. Respondent asserts that during the conversation to narrow down a
showing time, Chrysanthou asked if the home was "Section 8 approved." Respondent asserts that
its agent said no. and that Chrysanthou made the decision to cancel the appointment Respondent
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asserts that its agent did not cancel the showing appointment because the unit had not been
approved for Section 8 tenancy.
Respondent asserts that another agent brought in a Section 8 mobility tenant and that the
owner of the property began working with that agent so the unit could pass the Chicago Housing
A1,1thority Housing Quality Standards inspection~ Respo4dent ~se11s that the owner signed the
Request for Tenancy Approval documents for this tenanton November 19, 2012., and that an
inspection of the unit was performed on December 4~ 20l2. ·.
4~

COMPLAINANT REBUTTAL
Complainant asserts that on October 9, 2Q12, slle b,~d an; appointmen~ to vie.w tJ!e: unit but

th~tChr:ys~thou did not. show up. He reschedul¢d. the .sh9Wfu.:g>for October .10, 2012~
Complain~t asserts that on October 10, 2012, Chty&alJ,tho~ d,id IJ:otshow up
@d instead
sentthe.te:xt message that read, ..I was just advised thatW()od is not Section~ approved so our
sh<twing is cancelled." Complainant asserts that statiJlg tb,at ~·sec;tion 8 is not approved" is a

agam

deriial of housing based on Complainant's status as a Housing Choice Voucher holder.

5.

WITNESSSTATEMENTS
a.

Name: Peter Cprysanthou
Title or Relationship to Parties: Comglainant's Agent
Witness Proposed by; Complainant
· · ·
Statement Provided: Chtysanthou states that he told Compl~ant verbatim what
the realtor told him. He states that he really does not re:rp.em.ber if he cancelled the appointment.
He states that he thinks he tried to schedule an appo4ltment and tb.a.t when he called to schedule
it the realtor told him that the apartment was not Sectj~m 8 approved; He confrrrtis that he sent
Complainant a text message relating to her what the agent said.
b.

Name: Izora Hinton
. Title or Relationship to Piirties: Respondent's Broker
Witness Proposed by: Resgondent
Statement Provided: Hinton states that the unitwent on.the market on October
14, 2012. Hinton states that she docillnents the date and time of every caller and was able to be
specific about when Chrysanthou called. Hinton states thatChrysanthou stated that Complainant
was approved for the Section 8 mobility program and aSked her if the home was Section 8
approved. Hinton states that she said no. Hinton states tl:mt sl!e did. not tell Chrysanthou to cance~
the appointment. or that Section 8 voucher holders were not accepted. He just cancelled the
showing. Hinton states that she believes that the successful applicant, who has a Housing Choice
Voucher, applied for the unit towards the end of October and that the owner signed off on the
Request for Tenancy Approval on November 19.
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6.

DESCRIPTION OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS. This may not include every
document obtained, but includes any evidentiary documents (other than Complaints,
Verified Responses, and Position Statements) on which the Commission bases its
detennination.
a.

Title or Description: E-mails between Hinton
.and
22,2012
. ..............
.... ...Chrysanthou,
. . .. .
.dated
. October

-Souree:--Respondent------------------··-.- ~---,···· --.. -·-···-.------~-----·-···· ---·
Relevant Content: These e-mails show that Chrysanthou contacted lJinton on
October 22, 2012 to set lip a showing of the property. They settled on the followin& day at 5:45
P~Iil..

b.

Title or Description: Text Messages from Clu:ysanthou; dated-October 24.2012
Source: Complainant.· . . . .
. . ··. ..•.·. · . . . .. . .
m

...

·_····.

•

..

·•

•••

•

••

Relevant Coil tent: Two text messages wete provid~cl, ·both 4at¢<1 Oc;tober 24,
2012; one time-stamped 12:49 p.m., the other time-:-stamp~d 12tSO p,Jn, Both messages read, "I
wasjust advised that Wood is not Section 8 approved so our showi.n.g ~s c~celled.;' ,,

c..

Title·
witlt. application
for ······
tenancy.
2012 or Description: E-:-mail
.
. .. . . .........
... . dated·
. . November
.. . l.

Source: Respondent
Relevant Content: This e~mail, with the subject 1;4le1 ''10506 S. Wood." is.froJit a
broker at Centered International Realty to Izora Hinton. It s~tes that the attached application is
from a Section 8 mobility program tenant, Natalia Harris.
·
Title or Description: E-mails between.RicbardDykstra and Betts Realty. dated
November 5, 2012
. ·
·
Source: Respondent
Relevant Content: This e-mail string indicates that both property owners and the
property manager wish to rent 10506 S Wood to Harris.
d.

Title or Description: Request for Tenancy Approval Packet
Source: Respondent
Relevant Content: This document, issued by the Chicago Housing Aut,bority,
lists the voucher holder's name and voucher number as well as the owner's name; David
Dykstra
e.

Title or Description: Request for Tenancy Approval form. page 2
Source: Respondent
Relevant Content: This document lists Natalia Harris as the head of household,
Richard Dykstra as an owner, and Jennifer Milazzo as a representative. This document' reflects a
signature date of November 19, 2012 by Milazzo.
f.
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7.

DETERMINATION

Complainant alleges that she was denied the opportunity to rent the unit at 10506 S.
Wood based on her source of income when her real estate agent cancelled a showing of· an
available housing unit because he was told that the unit was not ''Section 8 approved."
Respondent asserts that when the real estate agent called; he met~ly asked whether the unit was
Sec:tion 8 approved, and because it was not, Respondent's a~en(tolp hhn no. Complainanf.s
ag¢nt opted to cancel the. showing even though Respondenrs agent did not. sUtte that it would not
copsider renting to Complainant because she .bad .a liousiiig C~<Jice. Voucher. Respondent
furtberasserts that the unit was eventuallyrented to a HouSmgChoi<teVoucherholder.
The investigation revealed that Complainant's ~altor,. Pet.er CbrysMtb.ou, contacted
R~spondent' s broker, l:z:ora Hinton, to ~edule a sh:Q\ViP~of!h¢ Ml~i Dliritlg this C.qqvef$ation, .
Chr:Ysanthou and Hinton discussed whether the unit W3.$ ''SectiQn S.;ippr<iv~.d./~ Chtys~thuu did
not recall much of this conversation. Hinton asserted that. Chrysan:th()u asked her whether· the
hoJl1e was Section 8 approved and that she answered, "No:t :ainton stated that . it was
Chrysanthou who made the decision to cancel the sh9wing. ChrysMthou stated that he did not
remember whether he capc:elled the showing but that he seAt C<)Jil'.lPlaitiant a text message
informing her that the housing was not approved for Section s~ The text message provide<\ hy
Complainant does not indicate who decided tO cancel the vieW:il:lg of tbe unit ·
asserts that. Hinton's statementto Cbrysanthou that tlte unit was not Section
8 approved constitutes a refusal to rent. The evidence does· not support: this assertion. There is no
showing that· Hinton's answer to Chrysanthou's question expr~sed any refusal to p~icipate in
the Housing Choice Voucher program, or a belief that the unit would not qualify for the program.
Hinton merely responded to a question. There was no evidence that Respondent would not have
acc¢pted or processed an application from Complainant. On the conttary, the investigation
revealed that the successful applicant is a Housing Choice Voucher holder. The documents
provided show that the property owner's representative signed that tenant's Request for Tenancy
Approval document on November 19, 2012, which was eight days prior to Complainant's filing
of this Complaint.
~omplailiant

Accordingly, the Commission fmds no substantial evidence of discrimination based on
Source of Income.
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City of Chicago
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
740 N. Sedgwick, 3rd Floor, Chicago, IL 60654
312/744-4111 (Voice), 312/744-1081 (Fax), 312/744-1088 (TDD)

IN THE MA ITER OF:

Cherry Beasley
Complainant,
Case No.: 12-H-77

v.
Date Mailed: June 11,2015

Betts Realty Group, P.C.
Respondent.
TO:

J. Damian Ortiz

The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing
Legal Clinic
315 S. Plymouth Court
Chicago, IL 60604

Izora Hinton
Betts Realty Group, P. C.
9730 S. Western Ave.
Evergreen Park, IL 60805

ORDER DENTYING REQUEST FOR REVIEW
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on May 29, 2015, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations
denied Complainant's Request for Review. Based on the criteria for granting a request for review as set
forth in Reg. 250.130, the Commission fmds that it does not state grounds sufficient to have the
Commission modify its decision of October 4, 2013, or to reopen this matter for further proceedings
with the Commission for the reasons set forth below.
Complainant, who has a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher, filed this Complaint alleging that
Respondent discriminated against her based on her source of income when its agent, Izora Hinton, told
her real estate agent, Peter Chrysanthou, that an available apartment was "not Section 8 approved."
Respondent argued that during a conversation to schedule Complainant's viewing ofthe apartment,
Chrysanthou asked Hinton if the unit was Section 8 approved and Hinton responded that it was not, at
which time Chrysanthou cancelled the appointment. Respondent asserted that Hinton merely responded
to Chrysanthou's question; Chrysanthou made the decision to cancel the showing. Respondent argued
that Hinton never stated that Respondent would not accept Complainant's voucher. Moreover, prior to
Complainant filing this Complaint, Respondent rented the unit to another Housing Choice Voucher
holder. During the Commission's investigation, Chrysanthou could not recall the entire conversation he
had with Hinton, or whether he cancelled the appointment for the showing, but affirms that Hinton told
him the unit was not Section 8 approved.
In finding no substantial evidence of source of income discrimination, the Commission determined that
there was no showing that Hinton's response to Chrysanthou's question expressed any refusal to rent the
housing to a Housing Choice Voucher holder. No evidence was presented that Respondent would not
have accepted or processed Complainant's rental application. On the contrary, there was objective
documentary evidence that 22 days prior to Complainant filing this Complaint, Respondent
communicated by e-mail with the owner of the housing in question about a different Housing Choice

· Voucher applicant, and the property owner stated that he wished to rent the unit to that applicant.
Fourteen days later, and eight days before Complainant filed this Complaint, the owner signed Chicago
Housing Authority Request for Tenancy Approval papers for that applicant.
In her Request for Review, Complainant argues that the Commission erred in finding no substantial evidence
of source of income discrimination because (1) a property owner is not exempt trom liability for
discrimination ... because the property in question has not been "Section 8 approved;" (2) while Hinton may
have "only" answered Chrysanthou's question, she still made the discriminatory statement that the housing
was not Section 8 approved; (3) the Commission made an improper credibility determination when it
believed Respondent's version that Hinton only answered Chrysanthou's question; (4) as a real estate
professional, Hinton should have known that making such a statement was discriminatory; and (5) the
Commission erred in relying on the fact that Respondent later rented the housing to a Housing Choice
Voucher holder.

In considering a request for review filed after a finding of no substantial evidence, the Commission
looks to see whether a complainant has presented relevant evidence which is newly discovered, and not
available at the time of the original decision; new and dispositive legal precedent not available at the
time of the original decision; a material misrepresentation, misstatement or omission which was a basis
for the decision; or a material error by the Commission. Reg. 250.130(b). The purpose of a request for
review is to provide an opportunity to address specific errors, not simply to revisit the investigation or
determination. Williams v. Continental Casualty Co., CCHR No. 05-E-125 (Dec. 14, 2006). See also,
Loving v. Marshall Hotel eta!., CCHR No. 06-H-17 (Nov. 2, 2006).
Complainant's request for review did not provide any basis for reconsideration orreversal of the finding
of no substantial evidence. The investigation did not reveal any evidence ofintent to discriminate based
on Complainant's source of income. While Complainant argues that the Commission made an improper
credibility determination when it "believed" Respondent's assertion that Hinton only answered
Complainant's question, the Commission assessed the available evidence and determined that Hinton's
response did not constitute a refusal to rent. Commission investigations do not resolve any material
factual issue based on evidence subject to a credibility determination; but application of the shiftingburden analysis and analysis of the evidence should not be confused with making a credibility
determination. Wong v. City ofChicago Dept. ofFire, CCHR No. 99-E-73 (Dec. 5, 2002), ajf'd, No. 03
CH 00793 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Dec. 11, 2003). During the investigation, Chrysanthou did not dispute
Respondent's characterization of his telephone call with Hinton. He could not confirm what Hinton
told him, nor could he recall who cancelled the viewing of the apartment Furthermore, one could argue
that as a real estate professional, Chrysanthou should not have made an inquiry about whether
Respondent accepted Housing Choice Vouchers; he should have merely scheduled a viewing of the
housing on Complainant's behalf
The remaining evidence in this case was the undisputed fact that Respondent facilitated the rental of the
same housing to another Housing Choice Voucher holder prior to Complainant filing this Complaint.
Thus, the Commission determined that there was no substantial evidence that Respondent intended to
deny Complainant the opportunity to rent the apartment
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· Accordingly, the Commission DENIES the Request for Review and reaffirms its finding of no
substantial evidence.
CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
TO OBTAIN FURTHER REVIEW OF THIS DECISION, THE COMPLAINANT MAY FILE A PETITION FOR A COMMON
LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI WITH THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
ACCORDING TO APPLICABLE LAW. SEE THE ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW ACT, 73 5 ILCS 5/3 B 101.

